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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate whether the relationship between financial liberalization and bank 
efficiency is conditional on the country-level institutional environment. We use a data set of 
79,246 bank-year observations for 67 counties covering the period 1996-2005, and apply 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure bank cost efficiency. We first find evidence for a 
positive association between financial liberalization and bank cost efficiency. Next, we find 
support for the fact that the institutional environment matters for this relationship. In particular, 
we show that market transparency, legal framework efficiency and the quality of the overall 
institutional environment positively affect this relationship. Perhaps most interestingly, our 
findings suggest that freedom of press, transparency of information exchange and media 
dependence are fundamental for financial liberalization to positively affect bank cost efficiency. 
Without these conditions financial liberalization may not affect bank cost efficiency. (140 words) 
Key words: Financial liberalization, Institutions, Bank efficiency, Stochastic frontier 
analysis 
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Financial liberalization policies have been implemented for many years by many countries, as it 
is generally believed that these policies help building more efficient financial institutions by 
making them less state-directed and exposing them to increased market competition, which  
leads to more efficient ways of intermediating resources from savings to investments. Therefore, 
such policies are expected to positively contribute to economic growth (Bumann et al., 2013). At 
the same time, however, experiences with these policies have not always been positive. For 
example, in the early 1980s Latin American countries such as Chile and Argentina experienced 
huge macroeconomic crises after a period of strong financial liberalization (Diaz-Alejandro, 
1985). Also, the Asian crisis  of 1997-1998 was, at least partly, due to liberalization programs of 
financial markets these countries had been carried out since the late 1980s (Mishkin, 1999). 
These and other experiences suggest that we still do not exactly know under what conditions 
financial liberalization policies really work, i.e. the context in which these policies are carried 
out may have an impact on the outcomes of these policies. 
 In this paper we dig deeper into understanding what conditions may positively affect the 
impact of financial liberalization on the efficiency of financial institutions. In particular, we 
focus on the country-level institutional environment and investigate whether different 
institutional aspects affect the relationship between financial liberalization and the efficiency of 
financial institutions. In choosing this focus, we have been inspired by the existing empirical 
evidence on the determinants of bank efficiency. On the one hand, several studies have 
investigated the relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency (see, e.g., 
Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; Barajas et al., 2000; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003; Patti and Hardy, 
2005; Williams and Nguyen, 2005; Hermes and Vu, 2010; Hermes and Meesters, 2015). On the 
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other hand, empirical studies suggest that bank efficiency is affected by the underlying country-
level institutional setting (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
and Levine et al., 2000; Lensink et al., 2008; Hasan et al., 2009). Yet, no study has investigated 
whether these institutional conditions have an impact on the relationship between financial 
liberalization and bank efficiency. 
We use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure the cost efficiency of banks, using a 
dataset of 79,246 bank-year observations for 67 counties in the period 1996-2005. We first 
analyze the relationship between financial liberalization policies and bank cost efficiency 
conditional on institutional environment and show that indeed there is positive relationship, 
suggesting that financial liberalization improves bank efficiency. Next, we investigate whether 
institutional variables moderate the relationship between financial liberalization policies and 
bank efficiency. We look at various aspects of the institutional environment and find that they 
indeed help strengthening the positive association between financial liberalization policies and 
bank efficiency. More specifically, our findings suggest that freedom of press and transparency 
of information exchange and media independence are fundamental conditions that allow 
financial liberalization to positively affect bank cost efficiency. Without these conditions 
financial liberalization does not seem to affect bank cost efficiency. The results from this 
analysis are potentially important from a policy perspective. They may guide governments and 
policy makers to constitute policies that help improving the institutional environment, facilitating 
the effectiveness of financial liberalization policies on bank cost efficiency. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature 
review. Section 3 discusses how we measure financial liberalization and institutions. Section 4 
describes the methodology of measuring bank cost efficiency and our econometric modelling 
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approach. Moreover, this section shortly discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents 
our main empirical findings and discusses the robustness checks. In section 6 we discuss the 
conclusions from the analysis, reflect on its strengths and weaknesses, and provide possible ways 
of extending our research.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Financial liberalization and bank efficiency 
Financial liberalization policies reduce or even eliminate government controls and interventions 
in the country’s financial system. These policies aim at improving bank efficiency, which may be 
defined as the capacity of banks to transform inputs to outputs, i.e. facilitating the intermediation 
of funds from savings to investment. Improving the efficiency with which banks carry out their 
role as financial intermediaries should ultimately contribute to higher economic growth (Ataullah 
et al., 2004). Yet, the consequences of these policies for the financial sector, as well as for the 
macro economy as a whole, remain controversial.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that government controls and interventions 
interfere with the market price mechanism and weaken or even eliminate market competition, 
thereby adversely affecting the capacity of banks to intermediate funds from depositors to 
investors. Eliminating these controls and interventions, they argue, restores and strengthens the 
market price mechanism and improves the conditions for market competition, which is expected 
to stimulate more efficient allocation of scarce financial resources. First, financial liberalization 
policies remove interest ceilings and credit controls set by the government, allowing banks to 
choose to finance investment projects based on sound economic and financial criteria, instead of 
politically motivated criteria. Second, these policies may also allow for more domestic and/or 
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foreign banks entering the market, resulting in increased bank competition. This in turn weeds 
out inefficient banks and forces other ones to become more efficient in resource allocation, bank 
management, risk management and financial innovation in order to survive (Denizer et al., 2000; 
Claessens et al., 2001). Third, policies may include opening the capital account, which allows 
banks, next to domestic and foreign investors, to engage in improved portfolio diversification. In 
all these cases, bank efficiency is expected to improve as they enhance the banks’ intermediation 
role. 
Yet, others stress the potential adverse effects of financial liberalization on bank 
efficiency. Stiglitz (2000) argues that financial liberalization does not necessarily solve 
asymmetric information problems. Even in a more liberalized financial market, banks suffering 
from asymmetric information problems may be unable to improve their efficiency in 
transforming savings into investments. A crucial component of liberalization should be 
increasing the disclosure and transparency of information so as to allow banks to make informed 
decisions when allocating financial resources. Boot (2000) argues that financial liberalization 
may even deteriorate asymmetric information problems. Following financial liberalization, 
borrowers may have more easy access to bank loans due to the increase of competition in the 
banking market. The easier access reduces the value of building up long-term relationships of 
banks with their customers. When relationship lending becomes less important, banks experience 
a loss of information on customer credibility, which may actually aggravate their asymmetric 
information problems.  
The controversy regarding the consequences of financial liberalization for bank 
efficiency has not been fully solved by the empirical literature. Studies analyzing the relationship 
between financial liberalization include Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Kumbhakar et al., (2001), 
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Maudos et al. (2002), Isik and Hassan (2003), Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), Patti and Hardy 
(2005), Williams and Nguyen (2005), Ataullah et al. (2004), Ataullah and Le (2006), Denizer et 
al. (2007), Burki and Niazi (2010), and Bhattacharyya and Pal (2013). In most cases, these 
studies use data from a single country. Only a few studies use a multi-country setting  (see, e.g. 
Hermes and Vu,  2010; Williams, 2012; Andries and Capraru, 2013; Chortareas et al., 2013; and 
Hermes and Meesters, 2015). Moreover, from these empirical studies it remains unclear under 
what conditions the relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency is positive 
or negative. 
The theoretical (and empirical) controversy with respect to the consequences of financial 
liberalization policies on bank efficiency, and the mixed experiences countries have had with 
these policies in the past, leads us to consider the possibility that the nature of the relationship 
between financial liberalization policies and bank efficiency depends on the environment in 
which these policies are implemented. One potentially important contextual variable we focus on 
in our analysis is the institutional environment.  
 
2.2 The institutional environment and bank efficiency 
Several studies find that institutions matter for bank performance and financial development. In 
particular, several studies suggest that legal reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract 
enforcement and accounting practices improve the efficiency of financial intermediaries (La 
Porta et al., 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; and Levine et. al, 2000; Hasan et al., 
2009; Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013). Moreover, some studies focus on financial regulation and 
bank supervision and show that country-level differences in regulation and supervision may 
explain differences in bank performance between countries (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Barth et 
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al., 2006). Mamatzakis et al. (2013) find that strict labor regulation is associated with lower bank 
efficiency while certain aspects of credit regulation are positively associated with improved 
efficiency. Kalyvas and Mamatzakis (2014) show that credit information sharing improves bank 
efficiency, especially during the financial crisis of 2008-2010. Lensink and Meesters (2014) take 
a broader view when analyzing the relationship between institutions and bank efficiency. In 
particular, they use the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) as a measure of 
the country-level institutional quality and focus on explaining the efficiency of foreign banks. 
They find that higher quality of institutions improves the efficiency banks. 
 
2.3 Financial liberalization, institutions and bank efficiency 
While previous research has focused on analyzing the relationship between financial 
liberalization and bank efficiency and between the institutional environment and bank efficiency 
separately, we conjecture that the way financial liberalization affects bank efficiency may be 
conditional on the institutional environment. To the best of our knowledge this has not been 
analyzed before in the empirical literature. A few studies are related to what we aim to do in our 
paper. Chinn and Ito (2006) show that the impact of capital account liberalization on economic 
growth depends on the quality of institutions. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that 
the likelihood of a banking crisis following financial liberalization policies is higher when the 
institutional framework is weak, i.e. when the rule of law and contract enforcement mechanisms 
are weak and corruption is high. Delis (2012) comes closest to what we do in our paper. He 
examines the relationship between financial reforms, institutions and bank competition and 
shows that institutions are essential for financial liberalization policies to increase competition in 
the banking industry.  
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When talking about the institutional environment, we take a broad perspective, i.e. we go 
beyond the narrow definition of institutions in terms of legal reforms and/or bank regulation and 
supervision most previous studies have focused on. Instead, we follow Lensink and Meesters 
(2014) and look at various dimensions of institutions as described by the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). These indicators of the institutional environment have been 
widely used in economic research. In our research we are particularly interested in the following 
four institutional dimensions, i.e. voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption.  
 So, how can the institutional environment affect the relationship between financial 
liberalization and bank efficiency? We start the discussion by focusing on the voice and 
accountability dimension of the institutional environment. This dimension focuses on the extent 
to which a country has established democratic rights, freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and media independence. Financial institutions play a crucial role in collecting 
information and reducing asymmetric information (Stiglitz, 2000). Democratic rights and 
freedom of expression and association positively contribute to increased transparency and 
freedom of information exchange in a country. This, in turn better enables banks to fulfill their 
intermediary role by reducing asymmetric information. In a related fashion, media independence 
may increase the flow of information available to banks to play their role in efficiently 
intermediating savings to investments. Moreover, the media also plays the role as watchdog 
(Miller, 2006) and may reduce the probability of misuse of information by banks, increasing 
their efficiency in allocating financial resources. Houston et al. (2011) show that private 
monitoring and the existence of independent and competitive media reduce the extent of 
corruption in bank lending. Thus, when financial liberalization policies are carried out in 
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countries scoring high on voice and accountability, we expect the positive impact of these 
policies on bank efficiency will be higher as well. 
 Regulatory quality refers to perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
We argue that banks will be more willing to invest in improving the efficiency of their operations 
if they positively perceive the government’s ability to formulate and implement sound financial 
liberalization policies and if the government can be trusted and committed to pursuing them over 
the longer run. Thus, this dimension is important for the credibility of financial liberalization 
policies. Financial liberalization is therefore expected to be more effective in the presence of 
high levels of government effectiveness and regulatory quality. 
The next institutional dimension, rule of law, represents perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts. The importance of this dimension for the development of financial markets has 
been discussed extensively in the literature. La Porta et al. (1997; 2000) argue that differences in 
legal rules and quality of enforcement can explain the differences in the level of development of 
financial systems around the world. Beck and Levine (2002) find that the quality of the legal 
framework can boost financial development by effectively protecting the interests of outsiders 
and strengthening contract enforcement. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) point out that in a 
country with poor contract enforcement, banks require higher interest margins and investors have 
to set higher expected returns to compensate for the additional risk of default. Qian and Strahan 
(2007) find that strong creditor rights enhance loan availability, because lenders are more willing 
to provide credit on favorable terms. An effective legal framework with effective contract 
enforcement and strong creditor rights reduces risk premiums banks require when lending. 
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Japelli et al. (2005) point out that judicial efficiency reduces credit constraints and increases 
incentives for banks to extend credit in a competitive market. These studies point out that 
regulatory quality boosts financial development by reducing the costs for banks to carry out their 
intermediary role. Moreover, it reduces the uncertainty and risk of defaults. In such an 
environment, i.e. one in which regulations are conducive to promoting financial development, 
financial liberalization policies are therefore expected to be more successful in enhancing bank 
efficiency. 
The final institutional dimension refers to the extent to which corruption (i.e. public 
power is used for private gain) is prevalent in a country. The impact of corruption on the 
relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
corruption may negatively impact efficient financial intermediation when government officials 
and/or firm representatives bribe banks to get access to loans for low-productivity projects (Barth 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, corruption may reduce the capacity of financial intermediaries to 
accurately forecast the financial position of firms, as corruption is associated with higher levels 
of asymmetric information between the bank and its customers (Chen et al., 2010). Finally, Goel 
and Hasan (2011) find that higher levels of corruption are associated with a larger number of bad 
loans and loan defaults. Thus, corruption and efficient financial intermediation are negatively 
associated.  
On the other hand, however, research has also shown that corruption may stimulate 
economic and financial transactions. In the literature this has been termed the greasing the 
wheels hypothesis (Leff, 1964; Bardhan, 1997, Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Especially in an 
environment in which economic and financial transactions are inhibited by strong regulatory 
capture and administrative barriers, corruption may help overcoming the adverse effects of rules 
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and regulations on economic decision making. Corruption, for example in terms of paying a 
bribe to government officials may help in speeding up, or even circumventing, certain formal 
procedures and administrative barriers, which in turn may facilitate transactions. As the financial 
sector is generally seen as one of the economic sectors for which the regulatory burden is 
relatively high, the greasing the wheels hypothesis of corruption may be relevant. Several studies 
have found evidence for the greasing the wheel hypothesis (see, e.g., Méon and Weill, 2010; 
Dreher and Gassebner, 2013; Katoa and Satob, 2015). The hypothesis does not go uncontested in 
the literature, however (Campos et al., 2010). The context as well as the extent to which 
corruption takes place does seem to be important. 
Taking into account the above arguments, this leads us to expect that, when financial 
liberalization policies are carried out, the positive impact of these policies on bank efficiency 
may be either lower or higher in the presence of higher levels of corruption. Financial 
liberalization policies create the potential for banks to raise their efficiency due to extended 
markets, more competition, and reduction of government controls on interest rates and credit 
allocation, and corruption may effectively reduce or increase the extent to which banks will 
allocate resources more efficiently as the process of resource allocation remains being captured, 
or, alternatively, stimulated by corruptive practices. 
 
3. Data 
We use three different data sets for our analysis. Bank level data is taken from BankScope. These 
data are used in the estimations of bank-level efficiency. Reliable data from this source covering 
a sufficient number of banks is only available from 1996. The measures of financial 
liberalization are provided by the financial reform dataset developed by Abiad et al. (2010). 
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These data are available for the period 1973-2005. Measures of institutions and other country-
level data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators 
(WGI). BankScope is a comprehensive dataset covering most countries around the world and 
accounts for more than 90 per cent of all banking assets. Because BankScope data start in 1996 
and the dataset of Abiad et al. (2010) ends in 2005, we have to restrict our analysis to the period 
1996-2005.  
 
3.1 Financial liberalization 
Abiad et al. (2010) collect data on seven dimensions of financial liberalization in 91 countries. In 
our analysis, we only include four of the seven dimensions. That is, we use data on the presence 
of bank credit controls, interest rate controls, bank entry barriers, and state ownership of banks. 
The other three dimensions not included in our dataset are related to capital account restrictions, 
security market policies and prudential regulations. These dimensions have no direct link to 
banks and are therefore not relevant for the analysis in this paper. 
For each dimension Abiad et al. (2010) provide an annual rating indicating to what extent 
government policies have been taken to liberalize financial markets on this dimension. The 
higher the rating, the more liberalized markets are on this dimension. Credit controls describe the 
extent to which government policies are in place requiring banks to allocate a minimum amount 
of bank lending into prioritized industrial sectors. The variable credit controls ranges from 0 (i.e. 
credit allocation fully controlled by the government) to 4 (fully liberalized). Interest rate controls 
refer to government policies aiming at setting lending and deposit rates of banks. This variable 
ranges from 0 (i.e. interest rates fully set by the government) to 4 (fully liberalized). Entry 
barriers refer to the fact that the government restricts market entry of domestic and/or foreign 
13 
 
banks, by restricting the degree of participation of these banks, the scope of their activities, the 
location of bank operations, and/or the licensing of their activities. This variable ranges from 0 
(entrance entirely restricted by the government) to 4 (entrance fully liberalized). Finally, the 
variable state ownership refers to the extent to which the government controls the assets of the 
banking system and takes values from 0 (i.e. banking system is entirely state-owned) to 3 
(entirely privatized).  
 
4.2 Institutional environment 
The data describing the institutional environment are taken from the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) of the World Bank. Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) collect data on the institutional environment at the country-level. The data are based on a 
large number of country-level surveys carried out by survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms, measuring the 
views of firms, citizens and experts on various aspects of the institutional environment. The 
measures refer to perceptions instead of actual states of the institutional environment. As was 
discussed in section 2, we focus on four dimensions of institutions, i.e. voice and accountability 
(Voice), regulatory quality (Regulation), rule of law (Law), and control of corruption 
(Corruption), respectively. Values of these dimensions range from -2.5 to 2.5. A higher value 
corresponds to a better performance of a particular institutional dimension. This also holds for 
our corruption variable, as it is a measure of the extent to which corruption is controlled for. 
 
4. Methodology and econometric modelling approach 
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We measure bank efficiency by focusing on cost efficiency of banks. This approach has been 
widely used in the banking literature (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Cost efficiency is measured 
in terms of how close the actual costs of the activities of a bank are to what the costs of a best-
practice bank would have been in case it produces identical outputs and input prices and under 
the same conditions (Berger and Mester, 2003). In other words, cost efficiency measures the 
reduction in costs that could have been achieved if the bank is both allocatively and technically 
efficient. Since cost functions are not directly observable, inefficiencies are measured in 
comparison with an efficient cost frontier. Most studies on cost efficiency use either data 
envelopment analysis or stochastic frontier analysis to calculate the efficient frontier. We use 
stochastic frontier analysis, since it controls for measurement errors and other random effects.   
In the literature two approaches towards using stochastic frontier analysis have been 
used. First, the two-step stochastic frontier analysis estimates the efficient cost frontier and the 
equation measuring the inefficiencies (i.e. deviations from the frontier) in two separate steps 
(Aigner et al., 1977; and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977). Second, the cost frontier and 
inefficiency equation can be estimated simultaneously (Wang and Schmidt, 2002).  We use the 
second approach, because the two-step approach assumes that the efficiency term is independent 
and identically exponentially distributed in the first step, while in the second step the efficiency 
terms are assumed to be normally distributed and dependent on the explanatory variables. 
According to Wang and Schmidt (2002), the two-step approach yields biased coefficients. We 
apply the model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) to simultaneously estimate the cost 
frontier and the inefficiency equation.  





ln , = 	, , 








	, 	~	. . . (0, )          (1b). 
 
, is the total cost of bank i at time t; 	,, 
,, ,; 	 is the functional form of the cost 
frontier; , measures the cost inefficiency of bank i at time t; and , captures measurement 
errors and random effects. Within the cost frontier 	,, 
,, ,; 	, 	, is a vector of the 
logarithm of outputs of bank i at time t, 
, is a vector of the logarithm of input prices of bank i 
at time t, , is a vector of the specific variables of bank i at time t, and  is a vector of all 
parameters to be estimated. Equation (1a) explains the properties of both error terms in model 
(1). The error term , has the same properties as the error term in OLS. It has mean of zero and 
a normal distribution. The error term , measures bank inefficiency. It is independently and 
identically distributed with a normal distribution, truncated at 0 with ,. The specification of 
,  will be further developed in equation (3) below. 
For the specification of the cost function we use the model developed by Sealey and 
Lindley (1977) who state that a bank acts as an intermediary between funders and borrowers. 
The cost function has a translog specification as proposed by Christensen et al. (1973). Using 
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such a specification leads to a better fit of the frontier than the standard Cobb-Douglas 
specification (Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell, 2000). 
The full cost function can be specified as follows: 
 
ln!,", 		= # +	$ ln%_'()*+,+,", +	 ln%_-./*0,", +	1 ln%_.),.2,", +	3 ln-*.4,", +
	5 ln6,ℎ8++(,+,", +	9 ln6::/.2.4;(,", +	<!( +	=!( +	>(ln%_'()*+,+,",) +
	$# ln%_'()*+,+,", ∗ ln @%ABCDE,",F +	$$ ln @%GHIDJJ,",F ∗ ln @%KBIBL,",F +
	$$ ln @%GHIDJJ,",F ∗ ln-*.4,", +	$ ln @%GHIDJJ,",F ∗ ln6,ℎ8++(,+,", +
	$1 ln @%GHIDJJ,",F ∗ ln6::/.2.4;(,", +			$3 ln @%GHIDJJ,",F ∗ !( +	$5 @ln @%ABCDE,",FF

+
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	$ @ln @%KBIBL,",FF

+	 ln @%KBIBL,",F ∗ 	 ln-*.4,", +		1 ln @%KBIBL,",F ∗
	ln6,ℎ8++(,+,", +	3 ln @%KBIBL,",F ∗ ln6::/.2.4;(,", +	5 ln @%KBIBL,",F ∗ !( +
	9ln-*.4,",
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 +
	1$ ln6,ℎ8++(,+,", ∗ ln6::/.2.4;(,", +	1 ln6,ℎ8++(,+,", ∗ !( +
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 +	13 ln6::/.2.4;(,", ∗ !( +	15MNOP!Q,", 	+ 	19--RSA,", +
	,", + ,",             (2) 
 
The dependent variable is ln!,",, the logarithm of total cost of bank i in country j at time t.  
! is specified as total interest expenses plus total non-interest expenses times 1,000. The model 
consists of three types of input costs: cost of deposits (_'()*+,+), cost of labor (_-./*0), 
and cost of capital (_.),.2). _'()*+,+ is the ratio of total interest expenses to total 
deposits; _-./*0 is the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees times 1,000; 
_.),.2 is the ratio of total non-interest expenses minus total personnel expenses divided by 
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total non-earning assets. All these three input cost variables are taken in logarithm, i.e. 
ln_'()*+,+,",, ln_-./*0,",, and ln_.),.2,",.  
In addition, the model includes three categories of outputs: loans (-*.4), other earning 
assets (6,ℎ8++(,+), and off-balance sheet activities (6::/.2.4;(). Also these three output 
variables are taken in logarithm, i.e. ln-*.4,",, ln6,ℎ8++(,+,",, and ln6::/.2.4;(,",. 
Furthermore, we include two bank-specific variables MNOP!Q,", and --R,",. MNOP!Q is 
measured as the ratio of total equity over total asset of a bank and is used to control for the 
financial strategy of a bank. Different financial strategies may lead to different levels of bank 
cost efficiency. --R is measured as the ratio of loan loss reserves to total gross loans. This 
variable is used to control for the difference in risk-taking strategy of banks. Since the translog 
specification is a second order approximation of the cost function, we add time trend variables 
!( and !( to the model. Because we use a translog specification, we include the square of 
the input, output, bank-specific and time trend variables, as well as combinations of these 
variables, in the cost function. Furthermore, we control for time invariant, bank-specific 
characteristics by adding the constant term # into the model. In other words, we use a fixed-
effect estimator. 
We specify the inefficiency equation as follows: 
 
,", = 	T# +	∑ TVW X,",          (3) 
 
zi,j,t is a vector of variables determining the bank-specific distance to the cost frontier, i.e. our 
measure of bank inefficiency; δ’ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. This specification is 
used to analyze the relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency and the 
18 
 
impact institutions have on this relationship. Because the dependent variable in equation (3) is a 
measure of the extent of the inefficiency of a bank, a negative coefficient for the independent 
variables in the model is associated with lower levels of bank inefficiency, or higher bank 
efficiency. 
Most importantly for our analysis, equation (3) includes a variable 
Financial_liberalization, which is an aggregate measure of financial liberalization measures 
taken by the government. This measure is obtained by applying principal component analysis 
using data for the four dimensions of financial liberalization on which we focus our analysis, i.e. 
the presence of bank credit controls, interest rate controls, bank entry barriers, and state 
ownership of banks.1 Next to this aggregate measure of financial liberalization, we include 
several country-specific variables into the inefficiency equation as controls. These variables 
include the GDP growth rate (GDP_Growth) as a proxy for the level of economic growth, and 
the inflation rate (Inflation) and real interest rate (Interest_rate) to control for macro-economic 
and financial market conditions. We also include time trend variables Time and Time2 to allow 
for differences in bank efficiency over time. Thus, we use the following specification for the 
inefficiency equation: 
 
 ,", 	= T# +	T$Y'%_Y0*
,ℎ", +	TP4:2.,*4", + T1P4,(0(+,_0.,(", +	T3!(", + T5!(", 
																			+	T9Z4.4;.2_2/(0.2X.,*4 +	[,", 	          (4) 
 
                                                           
1
 See appendix table A1, panel 1 for the outcomes of the principal component analysis. The results show that there is 





Next, we investigate whether the institutional environment matters for the relationship 
between financial liberalization and bank efficiency. As explained in section 3, we use data for 
four dimensions to measure the institutional environment of a country based on Kaufmann et al. 
(2010), i.e. voice and accountability (Voice), regulatory quality (Regulation), rule of law (Law), 
and control of corruption (Corruption), respectively. As regulatory quality and rule of law are 
closely correlated, conceptually as well as statistically, we use principal component analysis to 
obtain a composite measure (labelled as Legal), capturing both institutional environment 
dimensions.2  
We then estimate the following equation: 
 
,", = T# +	T$Y'%_Y0*
,ℎ", +	TP4:2.,*4", + T1P4,(0(+,_0.,(", +	T3!(", +	T5!(", +	 
																															T9Z4.4;.2_2/(0.2X.,*4", +	T<\_P4+,,,*4+", +
																															T=Z4.4;.2_2/(0.2X.,*4	]	\_P4+,,,*4+", +	[,",     (5) 
 
In equation (5) V_Institutions is a vector of institutional variables including Voice, Corruption 
and Legal, our composite measure of the Regulatory quality and Rule of law of a country. 
Moreover, equation (5) includes an interaction term Financial_liberalization x V_Institutions, i.e. 
we analyze the interaction effect of the aggregate financial liberalization measure with each of 
our three institutional variables separately (i.e. we present the results of three different versions 
of equation (5)). These interaction terms should capture the impact of the institutional 
environment on the relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency. 
                                                           
2
 See appendix table A1, panel 2 for the outcomes of the principal component analysis. The results show that there is 




As a robustness check, we replace our individual institutional variables by a composite 
measure of the institutional environment of a country. We add this as a robustness check, since 
institutional factors may be highly correlated. The composite measure is based on a principal 
component analysis using data on (all) six institutional dimensions available in Kaufmann et al. 
(2010), i.e. we use data for Political stability and Government effectiveness, next to data for 
Voice, Corruption and our composite measure of the Regulatory quality and Rule of law. This 
composite measure is named C_Institutions. This measure is then interacted with our measure of 
financial liberalization (Financial_liberalization) to again investigate whether the relationship 
between financial liberalization and bank efficiency is influenced by the institutional 
environment in a country.3 Thus, we estimate equation (6):  
 
,", = T# +	T$Y'%_Y0*
,ℎ", +	TP4:2.,*4", + T1P4,(0(+,_0.,(", +	T3!(", +	T5!(", +	 
																															T9Z4.4;.2_2/(0.2X.,*4", +	T<_P4+,,,*4+", +
																															T=Z4.4;.2_2/(0.2X.,*4	]	_P4+,,,*4+", +	[,",     (6) 
 
Table 1 shows the list of countries and the corresponding number of bank-year 
observations for each country in our data set. In our dataset, we have 79,246 bank-year 
observations covering 24,047 unique banks in 67 countries for the period 1996-2005. The large 
share of the observations is from banks in the United States, followed by observations from 
banks in Italy and Japan. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the financial liberalization 
variables used in the analysis. The arithmetic means of the financial liberalization variables are 
relatively high because observations for the more liberalized and developed counties, such as the 
                                                           
3
 See appendix table A1, panel 3 for the outcomes of the principal component analysis. The results show that there is 




United States, Japan and Italy account for a large part of the observations in our dataset. Next to 
using the financial liberalization variables separately, we also use a financial liberalization index, 
which is obtained by carrying out principal component analysis based on the data of the four 
variables.  
 
<Insert table 1 here> 
<Insert table 2 here> 
 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the institutional and macroeconomic variables 
we use in the analysis. The first six variables are the six institutional dimensions, which are 
obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010). The last two variables Legal and C_Institutions are 
obtained by using principal component analysis. Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of the 
institutional dimensions of Kaufmann et al. (2010) in our dataset. The table shows that most of 
these institutional factors are highly correlated, supporting our approach to also create a 
composite measure of the institutional environment to investigate whether institutional 
conditions do affect the relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency.  
 
<Insert table 3 here> 
<Insert table 4 here> 
 
5. Results 
Table 5 presents the of estimating the cost frontier as specified in equation (2). The table shows 
that from the list of inputs, the coefficients of the cost of deposits and the cost of capital are 
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positive and significant. This implies that if these costs increase, this leads to an outward shift of 
the cost function, which is what we would also expect. Instead, the cost of labor leads to lower 
total costs, which seems counterintuitive. Yet, since our cost function has a translog 
specification, meaning that different inputs enter the total cost equation in several different ways 
(i.e. as individual variables, squared variables and interacted with any of the other variables in 
the model) with different signs, one cannot determine the relationship between the cost of an 
input and total input by simply looking at the coefficient of the individual input variable. Overall, 
we conclude that our specification of the cost frontier fits theory reasonably well. 
 
<Insert table 5 here> 
 
The focus of our analysis is on the results with respect to the inefficiency equation as 
specified in equations (4) to (6). The results of this analysis are presented in table 6. Column [1] 
in this table refers to equation (4), columns [2] to [4] provide the results of three specifications of 
equation (5) – each specification referring to one of the three institutional variables we focus on 
in the analysis – and column [5] shows the results for the estimations of equation (6).  
As discussed in section 2, in theory the relationship between financial liberalization and 
bank efficiency may be either positive or negative. The results of our analysis suggest that 
financial liberalization policies is associated with improvements of bank efficiency. The 
coefficient of Financial_liberalization – our composite measure financial liberalization, which 
includes policies related to relaxing credit and interest rate controls, bank entry barriers and 
government ownership of banks – is significant and negative in all but one of the specifications 
of the inefficiency equation presented in table 6.  
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Columns [2] to [4] in table 6 show the results when taking into the account the impact the 
institutional environment may have on the relationship between financial liberalization and bank 
efficiency. We start by focusing on the results for the bank inefficiency equation when using 
Voice as our measure of the institutional environment. As explained in section 2, this variable 
measures the extent to which a country has established democratic rights, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and media independence. Under these institutional conditions, banks are 
expected to be better able to collecting information and reducing asymmetric information, 
thereby increasing bank efficiency. The results in column [2] show that the coefficient of Voice 
is negative but not significant. Yet, when we interact Voice with our measure of financial 
liberalization, the results show a significant negative coefficient for the interaction term. This 
suggests that without well-established democratic rights, transparency, freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and media independence, financial liberalization as such does not 
stimulate higher bank efficiency. Only in an environment with higher levels of Voice, financial 
liberalization policies are effective. This outcome recalls theories suggesting that asymmetric 
information is a major barrier adversely affecting the effectiveness of financial liberalization 
policies. As mentioned in section 2, banks play an important role in collecting information and 
reducing asymmetric information. Democratic rights and freedom of expression and association 
positively contribute to increased transparency and freedom of information exchange in a 
country. This, in turn better enables banks to fulfill their intermediary role by reducing 
asymmetric information. Moreover, media independence increases the flow of information 
available to banks and helps reducing the probability of misuse of information by banks, 
increasing their efficiency in allocating financial resources. Thus, when financial liberalization 
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policies are carried out in countries scoring high on voice and accountability, we expect the 
positive impact of these policies on bank efficiency will be higher as well. 
Column [3] presents the results when using Legal as our measure of the institutional 
environment. As explained, this measure proxies the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, as 
well as the confidence the public has in the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts. Given an institutional environment in which the quality of government 
regulations, contract enforcement, property rights, etc. is high bank efficiency is expected to be 
higher as well. The results shown in the table support this view as the coefficient for Legal is 
negative and significant. The coefficient of the interaction term between Legal and our financial 
liberalization measure is negative and significant. This suggests that the positive association 
between financial liberalization and bank efficiency is strengthened when the legal environment 
is strong as well. 
As is shown in column [4] the coefficient for the variable measuring the role of control of 
corruption (Corruption) is positive and significant, indicating that bank efficiency is negatively 
associated with control of corruption, i.e. it is higher at higher levels of corruption. The 
interaction effect of control of corruption and financial liberalization is also negative and 
significant, suggesting that the positive association between financial liberalization and bank 
efficiency is strengthened in the presence of higher levels of corruption. This outcome matches 
the greasing the wheels hypothesis as explained in section 2. According to this hypothesis, 
corruption may have a positive influence on banking activities as it helps smoothing procedures 
and business transactions. Thus, in the presence of strong regulatory capture and administrative 
barriers, corruption may help overcoming the adverse effects of rules and regulations on 
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economic and financial transactions. For banks – which are confronted with a relatively high 
regulatory burden – the greasing the wheels hypothesis of corruption seems to be relevant. 
Finally, column [5] presents the results when using a composite measure of all six 
institutional dimensions available in the dataset developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). The 
results are very similar to those of Legal. That is, the composite institutional variable positively 
influences bank efficiency (the coefficient is negative and significant). Moreover, the interaction 
effect with the financial liberalization variable is also negative and significant,  suggesting that 
the positive association between financial liberalization and bank efficiency is strengthened 
when the institutional environment improves. 
 
<Insert table 6 here> 
 
We perform two robustness checks. First, we use one-year lagged variables for our 
measure of financial liberalization in all specifications presented in table 6. Using a one-year lag 
reflects the idea it may take some time before financial liberalization policies have an impact on 
bank efficiency. The results of this analysis are reported in tables 7 and 8 and are all very 
consistent with our main findings as reported in tables 5 and 6.  
 
<Insert table 7 here> 
<Insert table 8 here> 
 
Second, we aim at adding bank-specific variables to the inefficiency equation. In 
particular, we use bank size, measured as the logarithm of total asset of a bank, as our bank-
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specific variable. Bank size may either positively or negatively affect bank efficiency. On the 
one hand, larger banks may be more difficult to measure and govern, reflecting a negative 
association between bank size and bank efficiency. On the other hand, large banks may have 
access to cheaper funding due to scale economies and asymmetric information, which means that 
bank size and bank efficiency show a positive association. Adding this bank-specific measure to 
the inefficiency equation (not reported) does not change our main results. The coefficient of the 
bank size variable itself is positive and significant, i.e. the size of a bank has a negative 
association with bank efficiency. This suggests that larger bank are more difficult to manage, 
leading to higher levels of bank efficiency. 
 
8. Conclusions and final remarks 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that explicitly investigates the impact of the 
institutional environment on the relationship between financial liberalization and bank cost 
efficiency. Using a dataset consisting of 79,246 bank-year observations for 67 counties covering 
the period 1996-2005, and applying stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to measure bank cost 
efficiency, we find supportive evidence for the fact that the institutional environment indeed 
matters for the relationship between financial liberalization and bank efficiency.  
We first show that financial liberalization policies and bank cost efficiency are associated 
positively. Next, we find evidence that these policies only positively affect bank efficiency in the 
presence of better democratic rights, higher market transparency, and freedom of information 
exchange. We also show that the positive association between financial liberalization policies 
and bank efficiency is strengthened in the presence of higher levels of legal framework 
efficiency and at higher levels of the quality of the overall institutional environment. Finally, we 
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find that higher levels of corruption positively influence the relationship between financial 
liberalization and bank efficiency, a finding we interpret as supportive evidence for the greasing 
the wheel hypothesis. 
The results of this paper alerts us to the notion that successful financial liberalization 
policies may depend on the context in which they are carried out. In particular, the paper stresses 
the fact that the institutional environment helps making such policies more effective in 
improving financial sector performance. Perhaps most interestingly, democratic rights and the 
related institutional features such as transparency and freedom of information exchange and 
media independence seem to be especially relevant in order to ensure that financial liberalization 
can make a positive contribution to improvements in bank efficiency. In our view, therefore, 
these outcomes contain potentially important lessons for governments that aim at improving the 
quality of the financial sector by pursuing a strategy of financial liberalization policies. 
We acknowledge that the analysis in our paper can be extended and improved in various 
directions. We have focused on bank efficiency as a measure of bank performance. The analysis 
could be extended by looking at a wider range of measures of bank performance. Furthermore, 
the analysis uses data for the period 1996-2005. This is determined by the availability of data: 
BankScope data start in 1996 and the dataset of Abiad et al. (2010) ends in 2005. Our work could 
be extended to more recent years if an update of the financial liberalization data becomes 
available. This would allow us to analyze the impact of the recent financial crisis. Finally, 
although our sample covers a large number of bank observations in several countries, still some 
potentially important and interesting countries are currently not included. Adding more countries 
would also reduce the dominant position of the U.S. banks in our research. We leave these 
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Table 1: List of countries and number of bank-year observations per country 
Country Name Freq. Country Name Freq. Country Name Freq. 
Albania 21 India 185 Paraguay 75 
Argentina 1 Indonesia 228 Peru 108 
Australia 61 Ireland 7 Philippines 93 
Azerbaijan 6 Israel 41 Poland 83 
Bangladesh 85 Italy 5,961 Portugal 72 
Belarus 24 Jamaica 21 Romania 100 
Belgium 7 Japan 3,568 Russian Federation 312 
Brazil 68 Jordan 7 Singapore 55 
Bulgaria 37 Kenya 138 South Africa 43 
China-People's Rep. 47 Korea Rep. of 10 Spain 142 
Colombia 23 Kyrgyzstan 20 Sri Lanka 85 
Costa Rica 44 Latvia 126 Sweden 463 
Czech Republic 148 Lithuania 57 Switzerland 2,194 
Denmark 227 Madagascar 4 Tanzania 16 
Estonia 26 Malaysia 204 Thailand 111 
Ethiopia 37 Mexico 2 Uganda 4 
Finland 27 Morocco 5 Ukraine 97 
France 471 Mozambique 23 United Kingdom 381 
Georgia Rep. of 15 Nepal 75 Uruguay 1 
Germany 10 Netherlands 18 USA 61,905 
Greece 89 Nigeria 372 Vietnam 36 
Hong Kong 8 Norway 291 
Hungary 21 Pakistan 4 





Table 2 Summary statistics of the variables measuring different dimensions of financial liberalization 
 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
Credit control 79,861 2.9120 0.3194 0 3 
Interest rate control 79,861 2.9872 0.1350 0 3 
Entry barrier 79,861 2.9574 0.2306 0 3 
State ownership 79,861 2.7770 0.5346 0 3 
Financial_liberalization 79,861 0.6223 0.7126 -8.4054 0.8675 
 
Note: Financial_liberalization is an index obtained by applying principal component analysis using the data for 





Table 3: Summary statistics of the variables measuring different dimensions of the institutional environment and 
macroeconomic characteristics 
Variables Observations Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
Corruption 79,861 1.5429 0.5956 -1.4884 2.5856 
Stability 79,861 0.4311 0.5614 -2.1213 1.6681 
Voice 79,861 1.2302 0.3619 -1.9476 1.8264 
Regulation 79,861 1.4620 0.4474 -1.7527 2.2261 
Effectiveness 79,861 1.5599 0.4943 -1.2822 2.3449 
Law 79,861 1.3704 0.4699 -1.5229 1.9875 
Legal 79,861 0.5428 0.8001 -4.7103 1.4848 
C_Institutions 79,861 0.7488 1.2785 -7.9317 2.8819 
Interest_rate 79,261 4.0978 3.0899 -41.2296 78.7900 
Inflation 79,830 2.6869 2.9973 -8.4842 168.6202 
GDP_Growth 79,831 2.9262 1.5850 -13.1267 26.4000 
 
Note: Legal and C_Institutions are variables obtained by applying principal component analysis using the data for the 
six individual measures of the institutional environment; these measures are taken from Kaufmann et al. (2010). The 





Table 4: Correlation matrix of institutional variables 
 
Voice Stability Effectiveness Regulation Law Corruption 
Voice 1 
Stability 0.406* 1 
Effectiveness 0.8796** 0.358* 1 
Regulation 0.8811** 0.2767 0.9432*** 1 
Law 0.9104*** 0.3864* 0.9569*** 0.9131*** 1 
Corruption 0.8473** 0.2068 0.9463*** 0.8974** 0.9312*** 1 





Table 5: Estimation results for the cost frontier 
Dependent variable: ln (TC) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
ln (C_Deposits) 0.891*** 0.815*** 0.866*** 0.892*** 0.868*** 
(0.0262) (0.0271) (0.0267) (0.0264) (0.0266) 
ln (C_Labour) -0.0741*** -0.0600** -0.0925*** -0.0922*** -0.0896*** 
(0.0283) (0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0287) 
ln (C_Capital) 0.767*** 0.721*** 0.728*** 0.740*** 0.726*** 
(0.0274) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0280) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (C_Deposit) -0.0263*** -0.0284*** -0.0275*** -0.0270*** -0.0275*** 
(0.000677) (0.000713) (0.000704) (0.000702) (0.000703) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (C_Labor) -0.0801*** -0.0762*** -0.0799*** -0.0815*** -0.0800*** 
(0.00252) (0.00257) (0.00255) (0.00254) (0.00255) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (C_Capital) -0.0127*** -0.0144*** -0.0139*** -0.0135*** -0.0140*** 
(0.00174) (0.00178) (0.00176) (0.00175) (0.00176) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (Loan) 0.0132*** 0.0184*** 0.0162*** 0.0147*** 0.0161*** 
(0.00162) (0.00172) (0.00169) (0.00167) (0.00169) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (OthAssets) 0.00448*** 0.00224 0.00334** 0.00421*** 0.00337** 
(0.00141) (0.00145) (0.00144) (0.00143) (0.00144) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (Offbalance) -0.00106 -0.00290*** -0.00220*** -0.00170** -0.00214*** 
(0.000793) (0.000828) (0.000819) (0.000814) (0.000817) 
ln (C_Deposit) * Time -0.0342*** -0.0344*** -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.0342*** 
(0.000642) (0.000654) (0.000651) (0.000649) (0.000651) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (C_Labour) -0.00341*** -0.00270** -0.00219* -0.00262** -0.00218* 
(0.00123) (0.00126) (0.00124) (0.00123) (0.00124) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (C_Capital) -0.0585*** -0.0549*** -0.0549*** -0.0558*** -0.0548*** 
(0.00232) (0.00237) (0.00236) (0.00235) (0.00237) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (Loan) -0.0363*** -0.0392*** -0.0369*** -0.0359*** -0.0372*** 
(0.00206) (0.00211) (0.00209) (0.00207) (0.00209) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (OthAssets) 0.0107*** 0.0125*** 0.0115*** 0.0106*** 0.0116*** 
(0.00161) (0.00163) (0.00161) (0.00160) (0.00161) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (Offbalance) 0.0141*** 0.0144*** 0.0139*** 0.0139*** 0.0140*** 
(0.00125) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00125) 
ln (C_Labor) * Time -0.0163*** -0.0151*** -0.0161*** -0.0168*** -0.0163*** 
(0.000936) (0.000944) (0.000933) (0.000930) (0.000934) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (C_Capital) -0.0306*** -0.0323*** -0.0318*** -0.0311*** -0.0316*** 
(0.00134) (0.00136) (0.00135) (0.00134) (0.00135) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (Loan) -0.0293*** -0.0290*** -0.0295*** -0.0295*** -0.0293*** 
(0.00149) (0.00151) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (OthAssets) -0.00564*** -0.00645*** -0.00615*** -0.00596*** -0.00624*** 
(0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.00129) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (Offbalance) 0.0271*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 
(0.000965) (0.000974) (0.000973) (0.000970) (0.000972) 
ln (C_Capital) * Time -0.0109*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** 
(0.000717) (0.000720) (0.000719) (0.000718) (0.000719) 
Loan 0.872*** 0.920*** 0.888*** 0.874*** 0.892*** 
(0.0231) (0.0239) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0236) 
OthAssets 0.341*** 0.310*** 0.326*** 0.339*** 0.325*** 
(0.0182) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0184) 
Offbalance -0.152*** -0.161*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.154*** 
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(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
ln (Loan) * ln (Loan) 0.0469*** 0.0462*** 0.0463*** 0.0465*** 0.0464*** 
(0.000673) (0.000700) (0.000697) (0.000690) (0.000696) 
ln (Loan) * ln (OthAssets) -0.0876*** -0.0865*** -0.0868*** -0.0872*** -0.0869*** 
(0.000870) (0.000891) (0.000889) (0.000883) (0.000888) 
ln (Loan) * ln (Offbalance) -0.00427*** -0.00367*** -0.00384*** -0.00402*** -0.00387*** 
(0.000597) (0.000614) (0.000612) (0.000607) (0.000611) 
ln (Loan) * Time 0.00412*** 0.00472*** 0.00453*** 0.00436*** 0.00452*** 
(0.000535) (0.000542) (0.000541) (0.000540) (0.000541) 
ln (OthAssets) * ln (OthAssets) 0.0393*** 0.0390*** 0.0391*** 0.0393*** 0.0392*** 
(0.000342) (0.000344) (0.000344) (0.000343) (0.000344) 
ln (OthAssets) * ln (Offbalance) 0.00544*** 0.00501*** 0.00511*** 0.00525*** 0.00516*** 
(0.000511) (0.000517) (0.000517) (0.000515) (0.000517) 
ln (OthAssets) * Time -0.00670*** -0.00691*** -0.00682*** -0.00675*** -0.00677*** 
(0.000470) (0.000472) (0.000471) (0.000471) (0.000471) 
ln (Offbalance) * ln (Offbalance) 0.00322*** 0.00313*** 0.00317*** 0.00321*** 0.00316*** 
(0.000238) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) 
ln (Offbalance) * Time 0.00188*** 0.00163*** 0.00173*** 0.00181*** 0.00173*** 
(0.000318) (0.000319) (0.000320) (0.000319) (0.000320) 
Time 0.0639*** 0.0472*** 0.0598*** 0.0674*** 0.0608*** 
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Time^2 -0.00571*** -0.00573*** -0.00568*** -0.00570*** -0.00571*** 
(0.000230) (0.000230) (0.000230) (0.000231) (0.000230) 
Equity -0.306*** -0.314*** -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.310*** 
(0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0173) 
LLR 0.00453*** 0.00372*** 0.00413*** 0.00444*** 0.00413*** 
(0.000308) (0.000321) (0.000316) (0.000312) (0.000316) 
Constant 7.604*** 7.316*** 7.630*** 7.684*** 7.600*** 
(0.199) (0.206) (0.202) (0.199) (0.202) 
      
Observations 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 6: Estimation results for bank cost inefficiency 
Dependent variable: bank cost 
inefficiency (mi,j,t) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Time -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.0719*** -0.0627*** -0.0745*** 
(0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0232) 
Time^2 0.0193*** 0.0183*** 0.0161*** 0.0154*** 0.0156*** 
(0.00203) (0.00206) (0.00208) (0.00209) (0.00208) 
Financial_liberalization -0.156*** 0.0257 -0.267*** -0.135*** -0.256*** 
(0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0247) (0.0168) (0.0242) 
GDP_Growth -0.0190*** -0.0191*** -0.0120** -0.0161*** -0.0129** 
(0.00585) (0.00595) (0.00591) (0.00588) (0.00591) 
Inflation 0.149*** 0.0995*** 0.135*** 0.153*** 0.131*** 
(0.00419) (0.00466) (0.00516) (0.00522) (0.00521) 
Interest_rate 0.0551*** 0.0501*** 0.0573*** 0.0587*** 0.0562*** 
(0.00281) (0.00288) (0.00290) (0.00296) (0.00290) 
Voice -0.542*** 
(0.0341) 















Constant -3.837*** -3.949*** -2.963*** -3.784*** -3.750*** 
(0.0663) (0.0792) (0.0850) (0.0689) (0.0694) 
Observations 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 7: Estimation results for the cost frontier (with one-year lagged Financial_liberalization) 
Dependent variable: ln (TC) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
ln (C_Deposits) 0.891*** 0.814*** 0.866*** 0.892*** 0.868*** 
(0.0262) (0.0271) (0.0267) (0.0264) (0.0266) 
ln (C_Labour) -0.0738*** -0.0596** -0.0923*** -0.0919*** -0.0893*** 
(0.0283) (0.0292) (0.0286) (0.0282) (0.0287) 
ln (C_Capital) 0.767*** 0.722*** 0.728*** 0.740*** 0.727*** 
(0.0274) (0.0283) (0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0280) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (C_Deposit) -0.0263*** -0.0284*** -0.0275*** -0.0270*** -0.0275*** 
(0.000677) (0.000713) (0.000704) (0.000702) (0.000703) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (C_Labor) -0.0800*** -0.0762*** -0.0799*** -0.0815*** -0.0800*** 
(0.00252) (0.00257) (0.00255) (0.00254) (0.00255) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (C_Capital) -0.0127*** -0.0144*** -0.0139*** -0.0135*** -0.0140*** 
(0.00174) (0.00178) (0.00176) (0.00175) (0.00176) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (Loan) 0.0133*** 0.0184*** 0.0162*** 0.0147*** 0.0161*** 
(0.00162) (0.00172) (0.00169) (0.00167) (0.00169) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (OthAssets) 0.00447*** 0.00225 0.00334** 0.00421*** 0.00337** 
(0.00141) (0.00145) (0.00144) (0.00143) (0.00144) 
ln (C_Deposit) * ln (Offbalance) -0.00106 -0.00290*** -0.00220*** -0.00170** -0.00214*** 
(0.000793) (0.000828) (0.000819) (0.000814) (0.000817) 
ln (C_Deposit) * Time -0.0342*** -0.0344*** -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.0342*** 
(0.000642) (0.000654) (0.000651) (0.000649) (0.000651) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (C_Labour) -0.00342*** -0.00272** -0.00221* -0.00263** -0.00219* 
(0.00123) (0.00126) (0.00124) (0.00123) (0.00124) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (C_Capital) -0.0585*** -0.0550*** -0.0550*** -0.0559*** -0.0549*** 
(0.00232) (0.00237) (0.00236) (0.00235) (0.00237) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (Loan) -0.0364*** -0.0392*** -0.0369*** -0.0359*** -0.0372*** 
(0.00206) (0.00211) (0.00209) (0.00207) (0.00209) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (OthAssets) 0.0108*** 0.0125*** 0.0115*** 0.0107*** 0.0116*** 
(0.00161) (0.00163) (0.00161) (0.00160) (0.00161) 
ln (C_Labor) * ln (Offbalance) 0.0141*** 0.0144*** 0.0139*** 0.0139*** 0.0140*** 
(0.00125) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00125) 
ln (C_Labor) * Time -0.0163*** -0.0150*** -0.0161*** -0.0168*** -0.0163*** 
(0.000936) (0.000945) (0.000933) (0.000930) (0.000934) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (C_Capital) -0.0306*** -0.0324*** -0.0318*** -0.0311*** -0.0316*** 
(0.00134) (0.00136) (0.00135) (0.00134) (0.00135) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (Loan) -0.0293*** -0.0290*** -0.0295*** -0.0295*** -0.0293*** 
(0.00149) (0.00151) (0.00150) (0.00150) (0.00150) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (OthAssets) -0.00564*** -0.00645*** -0.00615*** -0.00595*** -0.00623*** 
(0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.00129) 
ln (C_Capital) * ln (Offbalance) 0.0271*** 0.0273*** 0.0274*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 
(0.000965) (0.000974) (0.000973) (0.000970) (0.000972) 
ln (C_Capital) * Time -0.0109*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** -0.0111*** -0.0112*** 
(0.000717) (0.000720) (0.000719) (0.000718) (0.000719) 
Loan 0.872*** 0.920*** 0.888*** 0.874*** 0.892*** 
(0.0232) (0.0239) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.0236) 
OthAssets 0.341*** 0.310*** 0.326*** 0.339*** 0.325*** 
(0.0182) (0.0186) (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0184) 
Offbalance -0.152*** -0.161*** -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.154*** 
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(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
ln (Loan) * ln (Loan) 0.0469*** 0.0462*** 0.0463*** 0.0465*** 0.0464*** 
(0.000673) (0.000700) (0.000697) (0.000690) (0.000696) 
ln (Loan) * ln (OthAssets) -0.0876*** -0.0865*** -0.0868*** -0.0872*** -0.0869*** 
(0.000870) (0.000891) (0.000889) (0.000883) (0.000888) 
ln (Loan) * ln (Offbalance) -0.00426*** -0.00367*** -0.00384*** -0.00402*** -0.00387*** 
(0.000597) (0.000614) (0.000612) (0.000607) (0.000611) 
ln (Loan) * Time 0.00412*** 0.00473*** 0.00453*** 0.00437*** 0.00452*** 
(0.000535) (0.000542) (0.000541) (0.000540) (0.000541) 
ln (OthAssets) * ln (OthAssets) 0.0393*** 0.0390*** 0.0391*** 0.0393*** 0.0392*** 
(0.000342) (0.000344) (0.000344) (0.000343) (0.000344) 
ln (OthAssets) * ln (Offbalance) 0.00544*** 0.00501*** 0.00511*** 0.00525*** 0.00516*** 
(0.000511) (0.000517) (0.000517) (0.000515) (0.000517) 
ln (OthAssets) * Time -0.00670*** -0.00691*** -0.00682*** -0.00675*** -0.00677*** 
(0.000470) (0.000472) (0.000471) (0.000471) (0.000471) 
ln (Offbalance) * ln (Offbalance) 0.00322*** 0.00313*** 0.00317*** 0.00321*** 0.00316*** 
(0.000238) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) (0.000239) 
ln (Offbalance) * Time 0.00188*** 0.00163*** 0.00173*** 0.00181*** 0.00173*** 
(0.000318) (0.000319) (0.000319) (0.000319) (0.000320) 
Time 0.0638*** 0.0471*** 0.0597*** 0.0672*** 0.0607*** 
(0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) 
Time^2 -0.00571*** -0.00573*** -0.00568*** -0.00570*** -0.00571*** 
(0.000230) (0.000230) (0.000230) (0.000231) (0.000230) 
Equity -0.306*** -0.314*** -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.310*** 
(0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.0173) 
LLR 0.00452*** 0.00372*** 0.00413*** 0.00444*** 0.00413*** 
(0.000308) (0.000321) (0.000316) (0.000312) (0.000316) 
Constant 7.601*** 7.314*** 7.629*** 7.683*** 7.599*** 
(0.199) (0.206) (0.202) (0.199) (0.202) 
      
Observations 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 8: Estimation results for bank cost inefficiency (with one-year lagged Financial_liberalization) 
Dependent variable: bank 
cost inefficiency (mi,j,t) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Time -0.114*** -0.104*** -0.0719*** -0.0628*** -0.0745*** 
(0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0231) 
Time^2 0.0193*** 0.0183*** 0.0161*** 0.0154*** 0.0156*** 
(0.00203) (0.00206) (0.00208) (0.00209) (0.00208) 
L_Financial_liberalization -0.157*** 0.0247 -0.267*** -0.136*** -0.257*** 
(0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0247) (0.0168) (0.0242) 
GDP_Growth -0.0191*** -0.0191*** -0.0120** -0.0161*** -0.0130** 
(0.00585) (0.00595) (0.00591) (0.00589) (0.00591) 
Inflation 0.149*** 0.0996*** 0.135*** 0.153*** 0.131*** 
(0.00419) (0.00467) (0.00517) (0.00522) (0.00521) 
Interest_rate 0.0551*** 0.0501*** 0.0573*** 0.0587*** 0.0562*** 



















x C_Institutions -0.0569*** 
(0.00614) 
Constant -3.836*** -3.949*** -2.963*** -3.783*** -3.750*** 
(0.0663) (0.0791) (0.0850) (0.0689) (0.0694) 
Observations 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 79,246 
Standard errors in parentheses 







Appendix table A1: Composite measures for financial liberalization, legal environment and the overall institutional 
environment: Outcomes of the Principal Component Analysis 
Panel 1 
Results of Financial_liberalization based on Principal Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Component 1 1.8434 0.8935 0.4609 0.4609 
Component 2 0.9499 0.2262 0.2375 0.6983 
Component 3 0.7237 0.2406 0.1809 0.8792 
Component 4 0.4831 . 0.1208 1.0000 
 
Financial_liberalization is an aggregate measure of financial liberalization measures taken by the government. This measure is 
obtained by applying principal component analysis using data for four dimensions of financial liberalization, i.e. the presence of 
bank credit controls, interest rate controls, bank entry barriers, and state ownership of banks (Abiad et al, 2010). The results show 
that there is clearly one component that sufficiently incorporates the characteristics of the four underlying financial liberalization 
dimensions. 
Panel 2 
Results of Legal based on Principal Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Component 1 1.9332 1.8664 0.9666 0.9666 
Component 2 0.0668 . 0.0334 1.0000 
 
Legal is an aggregate measure of the legal environment  of a country. This measure is obtained by applying principal component 
analysis using data for two legal environmental dimensions, i.e. regulatory quality and rule of law (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The 
results show that there is clearly one component that sufficiently incorporates the characteristics of the two underlying legal 
environmental dimensions. 
Panel 3 
Results of Institutions based on Principal Component Analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Component 1 3.7584 3.6230 0.9396 0.9396 
Component 2 0.1354 0.0576 0.0339 0.9734 
Component 3 0.0779 0.0495 0.0195 0.9929 
Component 4 0.0284 . 0.0071 1.0000 
 
Institutions is an aggregate measure of the overall institutional environment  of a country. This measure is obtained by applying 
principal component analysis using data for six legal environmental dimensions, i.e. next to data for voice, corruption, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, political stability and government effectiveness (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The results show that there is 
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